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Abstract
We study an investor’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem when he is con-
fronted with two possibly misspecified submodels of stock returns: one with IID returns and the
other with predictability. We adopt a generalized recursive ambiguity model to accommodate
the investor’s aversion to model uncertainty. The investor deals with specification doubts by
slanting his beliefs about submodels of returns pessimistically, causing his investment strategy to
be more conservative than the Bayesian strategy. This effect is especially strong when the sub-
model with a low Bayesian probability delivers a much smaller continuation value. Unlike in the
Bayesian framework, the hedging demand against model uncertainty may cause the investor’s
stock allocation to decrease sharply given a small doubt of return predictability, even though
the predictive variable is large. Adopting the Bayesian strategy can lead to sizable welfare costs
for an ambiguity-averse investor, especially when he has a strong prior of return predictability.
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1. Introduction
One of the most debated questions in recent financial research is whether asset returns or equity
premia are predictable.1 This question is of significant importance for portfolio choice. If asset
returns are independently and identically distributed (IID) over time, then the optimal asset allo-
cation is constant over time (Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969)). However, if asset returns are
predictable, then the optimal asset allocation depends on the investment horizon and the predic-
tive variables (Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997), Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Kim and
Omberg (1996)). Economists have different views on whether asset returns are predictable. Welch
and Goyal (2008) argue that the existing empirical models of predicting asset returns do not outper-
form the simple IID model both in sample and out of sample, and thus are not useful for investment
advice. Campbell and Thompson (2008) argue that the empirical models of predictability can yield
useful out-of-sample forecasts if one restricts parameters in economically justified ways. Cochrane
(2008) points out that poor out-of-sample performance is not a test against the predictability of
asset returns.
While many estimation models deliver significant variations in expected returns, the predictive
relation is statistically weak and unstable. The estimated predictability coefficient is typically not
quite significant and R2 is generally low. In addition, the sample period and predictive variables are
important for regression performance. This suggests that the estimation models may be misspec-
ified. The contrast between the economic significance of various return predictability models and
their marginal statistical significance presents a dilemma for investors. The significant variation in
expected returns predicted by these models implies aggressive market timing strategies, which can
be very costly if they turn out to be wrong.
How should a long-term investor make consumption and portfolio choice decisions when facing
alternative possibly misspecified models of asset returns? To address this question, we build a
dynamic model in which an investor is concerned about model misspecification and averse to model
uncertainty.2 Following most papers in the portfolio choice literature, we consider a simple environ-
ment in which the investor allocates his wealth between a risky stock and a risk-free bond with a
constant real interest rate. We depart from this literature and the rational expectations hypothesis
by assuming that there are two submodels of the stock return process: an IID model and a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model. For simplicity, we adopt the (demeaned) dividend yield as the single
predictive variable in the VAR estimation and abstract away from parameter uncertainty. The
investor is unsure which one is the true model of the stock return, and thus faces a model selection
problem. The investor can learn about the asset return model by observing past data.
The standard Bayesian approach to this learning problem is to impose a prior over the possible
1For an example, see the July 2008 issue of the Review of Financial Studies.
2Our notion of model uncertainty is in the sense of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity in that no known probabil-
ities are available to guide choices. A classical example to illustrate ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is the Ellsberg
Paradox (Ellsberg (1961)).
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stock return submodels. The posteriors and likelihoods are derived by Bayesian updating. They
can be reduced to a single predictive distribution by Bayesian averaging. One can then solve
the investor’s decision problem using this predictive distribution in the standard expected utility
framework (see Barberis (2000), Pastor and Stambaugh (2011), Wachter and Warusawitharana
(2009), and Xia (2001)). We depart from this Bayesian approach in that we assume that posteriors
and likelihoods cannot be reduced to a predictive distribution in the investor’s utility function. This
irreducibility of compound distributions captures attitudes towards model uncertainty or ambiguity,
as discussed by Hansen (2007), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005, 2009), Segal (1987), and
Seo (2009). The standard Bayesian approach implies ambiguity neutrality.
To accommodate model ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, we adopt a recursive ambiguity
utility model recently proposed by Hayashi and Miao (2010) and Ju and Miao (2010), who generalize
the model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005, 2009). This generalized recursive ambiguity
model is tractable in that it is smooth and allows for flexible parametric specifications, e.g., a
homothetic functional form, as in Epstein and Zin (1989). We may alternatively interpret this
utility model as a model of robustness in that the investor is averse to model misspecification
and seeks robust decision making. We find that an ambiguity-averse investor slants his beliefs
towards the submodel of stock returns that delivers the lowest continuation value. The endogenous
evolution of these pessimistic beliefs has important consequences in the consumption and portfolio
choice decision and welfare implications.
We calibrate the ambiguity aversion parameter using thought experiments related to the Ells-
berg Paradox (see Halevy (2007) and the references cited therein). Our calibrated value is consistent
with the experimental finding reported by Camerer (1999), which suggests that the ambiguity pre-
mium is typically about 10 to 20 percent of the expected value of bets. We use our calibrated value
of the ambiguity aversion parameter, the standard value of risk aversion parameter, and economet-
ric estimates of the stock return process to solve an ambiguity-averse investor’s decision problem
numerically. We refer to the optimal stock allocation rule for an ambiguity-averse investor as the
robust strategy. We compare this robust strategy with three other investment strategies widely
studied in the literature: the IID strategy, the VAR strategy, and the Bayesian strategy. The IID
and VAR strategies refer to the optimal investment strategies when the investor knows for sure
that the stock return follows an IID model and a VAR model, respectively. The Bayesian strategy
refers to the optimal investment strategy in the Bayesian framework.3
We show that the robust stock allocation depends on the investment horizon, the beliefs about
the model of stock returns, and the predictive variable. Compared to the Bayesian strategy, the
robust strategy is more conservative in that it recommends an ambiguity-averse investor to hold less
stocks than a Bayesian investor, inducing more nonparticipation in the stock market. To understand
the differences between the Bayesian and the robust strategies, we first review the portfolio rule
3Assuming that the investor maximizes expected utility from next-period wealth, Kandel and Stambaugh (1996)
study myopic strategy in a Bayesian framework.
2
under the Bayesian strategy studied by Xia (2001) for the case of parameter uncertainty. The
Bayesian stock demand can be decomposed into a myopic demand and an intertemporal hedging
demand. The myopic demand depends on the expected return, which is the weighted average of
the expected returns from the two submodels of stock returns. The hedging demand can be further
decomposed into two components. The first component is the hedging demand associated with
the predictive variable. This component is analyzed by Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Kim
and Omberg (1996) in settings without model uncertainty. The second component is the hedging
demand against model uncertainty. High realized returns lead the Bayesian investor to shift his
posterior beliefs towards (away from) the VAR model when the predictive variable is sufficiently
large (small), which may make this hedging demand negative (positive).
What makes the robust strategy different from the Bayesian strategy is that an ambiguity-
averse investor effectively makes investment decisions using endogenously distorted beliefs, but not
using the actual predictive distribution. For a given nondegenerate prior, the distortion in beliefs is
large when the difference in continuation values under the two submodels of stock returns is large.
In this case, an ambiguity-averse investor is concerned about the potential large utility loss due
to model misspecification and hence shifts his beliefs towards the submodel that delivers a lower
continuation value. Consequently, both the myopic and the hedging demands implied by the robust
strategy can be quite different from those implied by the Bayesian strategy.
Given a nondegenerate prior, large differences in continuation values under the VAR and IID
submodels of stock returns occur when the predictive variable takes relatively high or low values,
causing large differences between the expected returns under the two submodels. If the submodel
that delivers a significantly worse outcome has a small Bayesian probability, then the distorted
belief is very sensitive to small changes in the Bayesian posterior, inducing a large negative hedging
demand against model uncertainty. This negative hedging demand lowers stock allocation signifi-
cantly. For example, when the predictive variable takes a large value and the Bayesian probability
of the VAR model is high, a small shift of the Bayesian belief towards the VAR model following
a high realized stock return causes a much larger shift of the distorted belief. Thus, the negative
hedging demand against model uncertainty under the robust strategy is much larger than that
under the Bayesian strategy. Consequently, an ambiguity-averse investor’s stock demand may be
only half as much as the Bayesian investor’s or less, and is even lower than what is delivered under
the IID strategy.
An important finding of our paper is that the robust and the Bayesian strategies may deliver
different market timing behavior and different stock allocations over time, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. First, take a sufficiently small prior probability of the IID model as given. The stock
allocation rises with the predictive variable under the Bayesian strategy but declines with it under
the robust strategy for a wide range of values of the predictive variable. Second, take a sufficiently
large value of the predictive variable as given. If the investor believes that the stock return follows
the VAR model for sure, then he would invest all his wealth in the stock. According to the Bayesian
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approach, the investor’s stock allocation should decrease monotonically as his prior probabilities
of the IID model rises. In contrast, we show that a very small prior probability of the IID model
can lead an ambiguity-averse investor to decrease his stock allocation sharply and then to increase
it gradually as the prior probability of the IID model rises. The large negative hedging demand
against model uncertainty under the robust strategy plays a key role in these two results.
To evaluate the welfare cost of adopting the Bayesian strategy for an ambiguity-averse investor,
we compute the wealth compensation that leaves him indifferent between adopting the Bayesian
and the robust strategies. We find that welfare costs depend crucially on the values of the predictive
variable and the prior probabilities. They are large when the predictive variable takes large values
and the prior probability of the IID model is small. In this case, the welfare costs are more than
20 percent of initial wealth.
We emphasize that our findings of large welfare costs and large differences between the Bayesian
and robust strategies are empirically relevant and apply to ambiguity-averse investors with strong
priors about the VAR model of stock returns. This model seems to be favored in the data, but
there is still a small Bayesian probability that the IID model is on the table in a finite sample of
data. In addition, the dividend-price ratio – the predictive variable used in our study – rose in
recent years, especially during the recent recession.
Our paper is related to a large literature on the portfolio choice problem (see Campbell and
Viceira (2002) and Wachter (2010) for a survey). In addition to the papers cited above, other
papers using the Bayesian framework include Brennan (1998), Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and
Stroud (2005), Detemple (1986), Dothan and Feldman (1986), Gennotte (1986), Gollier (2004),
and Veronesi (1999), among others. These papers often study parameter uncertainty and do not
consider investors’ aversion to model uncertainty.
Our paper is more closely related to the literature on applications of ambiguity aversion prefer-
ences to the study of the portfolio choice problem (e.g., Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), Garlappi,
Uppal, and Wang (2007), Maenhout (2004), and Uppal and Wang (2003)). This literature typically
applies either the multiple-priors approach or the robust control approach. Some papers use one
of these approaches to study equilibrium asset prices (e.g., Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003),
Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and Miao (2003), and Epstein and Wang (1994), Liu, Pan, and
Wang (2005)). Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2010) and Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang
(2010) use other models of ambiguity. All these papers do not allow for learning.
Epstein and Schneider (2007) and Miao (2009) introduce learning to the recursive multiple-
priors model. Unlike the present paper, they study a portfolio choice problem in which investors
are ambiguous about the mean stock return. Campanale (2011) also applies the multiple-priors
approach to quantitatively explain the stock market participation rates. Hansen (2007) and Hansen
and Sargent (2007a,b) develop models of learning in the robust control framework. Hansen and
Sargent (2010) apply this framework to the study of the equilibrium price of model uncertainty.
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They emphasize that fragile beliefs cause time-varying uncertainty premium. They refer to fragile
beliefs as responsiveness of pessimistic probabilities to the arrival of news, as determined by the
state dependent value functions that define what the consumer is pessimistic about. In our partial
equilibrium model, these fragile beliefs have important impact on portfolio choice decisions. In a
general equilibrium setup, Ju and Miao (2010) use the generalized recursive ambiguity utility model
to study the implications of fragile beliefs for asset pricing.
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper provides a first dynamic portfolio choice model
in which investors face a model selection problem using the generalized recursive ambiguity utility
model. As discussed in Hayashi and Miao (2010) and Ju and Miao (2010), this utility model
includes some other models of ambiguity as special cases, e.g., the recursive smooth ambiguity
model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009), the recursive multiple-priors model of Epstein
and Wang (1994) and Epstein and Schneider (2003), and the robust control model of Hansen and
Sargent (2001, 2007b).
In particular, when the ambiguity aversion parameter approaches infinity, our generalized am-
biguity model approaches the limit of a version of the multiple-priors utility model. In this case,
the investor follows the worst-case scenario by adopting either the IID strategy when the predictive
variable is sufficiently large, or the VAR strategy when the predictive variable is sufficiently small.
This portfolio rule is the extreme case of our model.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the recursive ambiguity model.
Section 3 presents an ambiguity-averse investor’s decision problem. Section 4 conducts calibration.
Section 5 analyzes dynamic asset allocations. Section 6 conducts welfare costs analysis. Section 7
concludes. Appendices collect proofs and numerical methods.
2. Recursive Ambiguity Preferences
In this section, we introduce the recursive ambiguity utility model adopted in our paper. In a
static setting, this utility model delivers essentially the same functional form that has appeared in
some other papers, e.g., Chew and Sagi (2008), Ergin and Gul (2009), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006), and Seo (2009).4 These papers provide various axiomatic foundations
and interpretations. Our adopted dynamic model is axiomatized by Hayashi and Miao (2010) and
closely related to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005, 2009). Here we focus on the utility
representation and refer the reader to the preceding papers for axiomatic foundations.
4See Epstein (2010) for a recent critique of this model and Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2011) for a reply.
Also see Hayashi and Miao (2010) for a related discussion.
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2.1. Utility
We start with a static setting in which a decision maker’s ambiguity preferences over consumption
are represented by the following utility function:
v−1
(∫
Π
v
(
u−1
(∫
S
u (C) dpi
))
dµ (pi)
)
, ∀C : S → R+, (1)
where u and v are increasing functions and µ is a subjective prior over the set Π of probability
measures on S that the decision maker thinks possible. When we define φ = v ◦ u−1, the utility
function in (1) is ordinally equivalent to the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005):
Eµφ (Epiu (C)) . (2)
A key feature of this model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as
a characteristic of the decision maker’s subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, identified as a
characteristic of the decision maker’s tastes. Specifically, ambiguity is characterized by properties
of the subjective set of measures Π. Attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by the shape of
φ, while attitudes towards pure risk are characterized by the shape of u. In particular, the decision
maker displays risk aversion if and only if u is concave, while he displays ambiguity aversion if and
only if φ is concave or, equivalently, if and only if v is a concave transformation of u. Note that
there is no reduction between µ and pi in general. It is this irreducibility of compound distribution
that captures ambiguity (Segal (1987)). When φ is linear, the decision maker is ambiguity neutral
and the smooth ambiguity model reduces to the standard expected utility model.
We now embed the static model (1) in a dynamic setting. Time is denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T,
where T could be finite or infinity. The state space in each period is denoted by S. At time
t, the decision maker’s information consists of history st = {s0, s1, s2, ..., st} with s0 ∈ S given
and st ∈ S. The decision maker ranks adapted consumption plans C = (Ct)t≥0 , where Ct is a
measurable function of st. The decision maker is ambiguous about the probability distribution on
the full state space ST . This uncertainty is described by an unobservable parameter z in the space
Z. The parameter z can be interpreted in several different ways. It could be an unknown model
parameter, a discrete indicator of alternative models, or a hidden state that evolves over time in a
regime-switching process.
The decision maker has a prior µ0 over the parameter z. Each parameter z gives a probability
distribution piz over the full state space. The posterior µt and the conditional likelihood can be
obtained by Bayes’ Rule. Inspired by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Kreps and Porteus (1978), we
adopt the specification:
u (c) =
c1−γ
1− γ
, γ > 0, 6= 1, (3)
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v (x) =
x1−η
1− η
, η > 0, 6= 1, (4)
and consider the following homothetic recursive ambiguity utility function:5
Vt (C) =

C1−γt + β
{
Eµt
(
Epiz,t
[
V 1−γt+1 (Ct+1)
]) 1−η
1−γ
} 1−γ
1−η


1
1−γ
, (5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and γ and η are the coefficients of constant relative
risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, respectively. If η = γ, the decision maker is ambiguity neutral
and (5) reduces to the standard time-additive expected utility model. In this case, the posterior µt
and the likelihood distribution piz,t can be reduced to a predictive distribution, which is the key idea
underlying the Bayesian analysis. The decision maker displays ambiguity aversion if and only if
η > γ. The coefficient of relative ambiguity aversion may be measured by |(η − γ) / (1− γ)| , which
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of φ (x) = v ◦ u−1 (x) = [(1− γ)x]
1−η
1−γ / (1− η) , x ∈ R.
When the decision maker displays infinite ambiguity aversion (η → ∞), we deduce from
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) that (5) converges to a version of the recursive multiple-
priors model of Epstein and Schneider (2007):
Vt (C) = min
z
{
C1−γt + βEpiz,t
[
V 1−γt+1 (Ct+1)
]} 1
1−γ
. (6)
In this case, the decision maker has multiple priors with Dirac measures and a single likelihood.
We may alternatively interpret the utility model defined in (5) as a model of robustness in
which the decision maker is concerned about model misspecification, and thus seeks robust decision
making. Specifically, each distribution piz describes an economic model. The decision maker is
ambiguous about which is the right model specification. He has a subjective prior µ0 over alternative
models. He is averse to model uncertainty, and thus evaluates different models using a concave
function v. We may also interpret u and v in (5) as describing source-dependent risk attitudes
(Chew and Sagi (2008)). That is, u captures risk attitudes for a given model distribution piz and
v captures risk attitudes towards model uncertainty.
2.2. How Large is Ambiguity Aversion Parameter?
Any new utility model other than the standard expected utility model will inevitably introduce some
new parameters. A natural question is: How does one calibrate these parameters? In general, there
are two approaches. First, one may derive equilibrium implications using the new utility model,
and then use market data to estimate preference parameters by matching moments or using other
5Ju and Miao (2010) and Hayashi and Miao (2010) propose a more general recursive ambiguity utility model with
axiomatic foundations that permits a three-way separation among risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and intertemporal
substitution.
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econometric methods (e.g., Hansen and Singleton (1982)). Second, one may use experimental or
field data to estimate the new preference parameters, like the standard way to elicit the risk aversion
parameter. In our recursive ambiguity utility model (5), the new parameter is the ambiguity
aversion parameter η. We will follow the second approach to calibrate this parameter in the static
setting (1).6
We elicit the ambiguity aversion parameter by introspection using thought experiments related
to the Ellsberg Paradox. Consider the following experiment similar to that in Halevy (2007).7
Suppose there are two urns. One urn contains 50 black balls and 50 white balls. The other urn
contains 100 balls, either all black or all white. But the exact composition is unknown to the
subjects. Subjects are asked to place a bet on the color of the ball drawn from each urn. The bet
on the second urn is placed before the color composition is known. If a bet on a specific urn is
correct, the subjects win a prize of d dollars. Otherwise, the subjects do not win or lose anything.
The experiments reported in Halevy (2007) show that most subjects prefer to bet on the first urn
over the second urn. Halevy (2007) also uses the Becker-DeGroot-Marschack mechanism to elicit
the certainty equivalent of a bet. As a result, one can compute the ambiguity premium as the
difference between the certainty equivalents of the bet on the first and the second urns. We can
then use the ambiguity premium to calibrate the ambiguity aversion parameter η.
Formally, we define the ambiguity premium as
u−1
(∫
Π
∫
S
u (c) dpidµ (pi)
)
− v−1
(∫
Π
v
(
u−1
(∫
S
u (c) dpi
))
dµ (pi)
)
. (7)
We then evaluate the bet in the previous experiment using the following parametric form: Let u
and v be given by (3) and (4), respectively. Let w be the decision maker’s wealth level. Suppose the
subjective prior µ = (0.5, 0.5) for the bet.8 For the bet on the second urn, Π has two probability
measures over the ball color: (0, 1) and (1, 0). We then derive the ambiguity premium as
(
0.5 (d+ w)1−γ + 0.5w1−γ
) 1
1−γ
−
(
0.5 (d+ w)1−η + 0.5w1−η
) 1
1−η
, (8)
for η > γ. We may express the ambiguity premium as a percentage of the expected value of the bet
(d/2). Clearly, the size of the ambiguity premium depends on the size of a bet or the prize-wealth
ratio d/w. Table 1 reports the ambiguity premium for various parameter values. Panel A considers
the prize-wealth ratio of 1%. Panel B considers a smaller bet, with the prize-wealth ratio of 0.5%.
[Insert Table 1 Here.]
6Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) advocate to use model detection error probabilities to calibrate the absolute
ambiguity aversion parameter θ for φ (x) = −e−
x
θ in equation (2). They interpret θ as a robustness parameter.
7See Strzalecki (2010) for a similar experiment. In an axiomatized model, he suggests the same approach as ours
to calibrate the ambiguity aversion parameter.
8Strictly speaking the bet deals with objective lotteries and the subjective probability measure may not be the
same as the objective measure. Seo’s (2009) utility model can accommodate the bet discussed in the paper. His
utility model gives the same expression as (8) for the ambiguity premium.
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Camerer (1999) reports that the ambiguity premium is typically in the order of 10-20 percent
of the expected value of a bet in the Ellsberg Paradox type experiments. Halevy (2007) finds a
similar value. Table 1 Panel A shows that the implied ambiguity premium falls in this range when
the ambiguity aversion parameter η is in the range of 50-90 and when the risk aversion parameter
γ is between 0 and 10. Our calibration depends crucially on the size of the bet. In experimental
studies, researchers typically consider small bets. For example, Halevy (2007) considers the prize
money of 2 or 20 Canadian dollars. It is likely that these prizes account for a very small fraction of
a subject’s wealth. In Panel B, when the prize-wealth ratio drops to 0.5%, even larger values of η
are needed to match the ambiguity premium from experimental studies. In our quantitative study
below, we focus on γ ∈ {2, 5, 10}. Based on the results from Table 1, we take three values (60, 80,
100) for η.
3. Decision Problem
We consider an investor’s consumption and portfolio choice problem in a finite-horizon discrete-
time environment. Time is denoted by t = 0, 1, ..., T. The investor is endowed with initial wealth
W0 in period zero, and his only source of income is his financial wealth. In each period t, he decides
how much to consume and how much to invest in the financial markets. We assume that there is
no bequest motive, so the investor consumes all his wealth CT =WT in period T .
3.1. Preferences and Investment Opportunities
There are two tradeable assets: a risky stock and a risk-free bond. The stock has gross real stock
return Rt+1 from t to t + 1. The risk-free bond has a constant gross real return Rf each period.
Define log returns rt+1 = log (Rt+1) and rf = log (Rf ). Observing data of the risk-free rate, the
stock return and a predictive variable xt, the investor faces the following two model specifications:
• Model 1 (IID):
rt+1 − rf = m1 + ε
r
1,t+1, (9)
xt+1 = ρ1xt + ε
x
1,t+1, (10)
where the expected return (m1) is constant, and ε1,t+1 =
[
εr1,t+1, ε
x
1,t+1
]′
is normally dis-
tributed white noise with mean zero and covariance matrix:
Ω1 =
[
(σr1)
2 σrx1
σrx1 (σ
x
1)
2
]
. (11)
• Model 2 (VAR):
rt+1 − rf = m2 + bxt + ε
r
2,t+1, (12)
9
xt+1 = ρ2xt + ε
x
2,t+1, (13)
where the conditional expected return (m2 + bxt) varies with the predictive variable, and
ε2,t+1 =
[
εr2,t+1, ε
x
2,t+1
]′
is normally distributed white noise with mean zero and covariance
matrix
Ω2 =
[
(σr2)
2 σrx2
σrx2 (σ
x
2)
2
]
. (14)
Assume that ε1,t+1 is independent of ε2,t+1. We estimate the parameters of both models using
the same historical data, which implies m1 = m2, ρ1 = ρ2 and σ
x
1 = σ
x
2 . Hence, we will drop the
subscripts for m, ρ and σx in the remainder of the paper. But generally σrx1 6= σ
rx
2 and σ
r
1 6= σ
r
2 so
that the above two model specifications are not nested.
More generally, xt may be a vector of predictive variables. In our empirical application in
this paper, we will focus on the cases with a single predictive variable. The investor faces model
uncertainty because he is concerned that both of the above two models of stock returns may be
misspecified. He does not know which of these models generates the data. He can learn about
the true model by observing past data. During the process of learning, he is averse to model
uncertainty. To capture his aversion to model uncertainty, we adopt the recursive ambiguity model
presented in Section 2 and assume that the investor’s utility function is given by (5).
3.2. Bayesian Posterior Dynamics
Let µt = Pr
(
z = 1|st
)
denote the posterior probability that Model 1 is the true model for the
return process, given the history of data st = {(r0, x0) , (r1, x1) ..., (rt, xt)}. By Bayes’ Rule, we can
derive the evolution of µt :
µt+1 =
µtL1,t+1
µtL1,t+1 + (1− µt)L2,t+1
, (15)
where for st+1 = [rt+1, xt+1]
′ ,
Lz,t+1 =
1
2pi |Ωz|
1/2
exp
[
−
1
2
(st+1 −mz,t)
′Ω−1z (st+1 −mz,t)
]
, z = 1, 2,
m1,t = [rf +m, ρxt]
′ , (16)
m2,t = [rf +m+ bxt, ρxt]
′ . (17)
The intuition for how the investor updates his Bayesian beliefs after observing the data of the
predictive variable and the stock return is as follows. The expected return is constant according
to the IID model, but it depends on the predictive variable in the VAR model. Assume that the
volatilities of returns are similar in the two models (which is true in our estimation below). If
the predictive variable is above average (i.e., xt > 0), the VAR model will predict above average
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returns. A high realized return will be more likely in the VAR model than in the IID model.
Thus, the observation of a high stock return makes the investor revise downward his belief about
the IID model (µt+1). However, if the predictive variable is below average (i.e., xt < 0), then the
observation of high stock return is more consistent with the IID model, causing the investor to
revise µt+1 upward. This updating process is important for understanding the hedging demand
analyzed in Section 5.1.
3.3. Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choice
Let Wt and ψt denote respectively the wealth level and the portfolio share of the stock in period t.
We can then write the investor’s budget constraint as
Wt+1 = Rp,t+1 (Wt − Ct) , (18)
where
Rp,t+1 = Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt)
is the portfolio return. We suppose that there are short-sale and margin restrictions such that
ψt ∈ [0, 1] . Otherwise, wealth may be negative because Rt+1 can go to infinity or zero. The
investor’s problem is to choose a consumption plan {Ct}
T
t=0 and a portfolio plan {ψt}
T
t=0 so as
to maximize his utility given by (5). We derive the investor’s decision problem using dynamic
programming. In each period t, the investor’s information may be summarized by three state
variables: wealth level Wt, the predictive variable xt, and the Bayesian belief µt. Let Jt (Wt, xt, µt)
denote the value function. Then it satisfies the Bellman equation:
Jt (Wt, xt, µt) = max
Ct,ψt
[
C1−γt + β
{
µt
(
E
1
t
[
J1−γt+1
(
Wt+1, xt+1, µt+1
)]) 1−η
1−γ
(19)
+ (1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
J1−γt+1
(
Wt+1, xt+1, µt+1
)]) 1−η
1−γ
} 1−γ
1−η


1
1−γ
,
subject to the budget constraint (18), the dynamics of xt (10) or (13), and the Bayesian belief dy-
namics (15). Here, E1t is the conditional expectation operator conditioned on information available
in period t, when the IID model (Model 1) is the true model for the stock return rt+1. In this
case, we substitute equations (9)-(10) for (rt+1, xt+1) into (15), and then substitute the resulting
expression for µt+1 into E
1
t
[
Jt+1
(
Wt+1, xt+1, µt+1
)]
. Similarly, E2t is the conditional expectation
operator conditioned on information available in period t, when the VAR model (Model 2) is the
true model for the stock return rt+1. In this case, we substitute equations (12)-(13) for (rt+1, xt+1)
into (15), and then substitute the resulting expression for µt+1 into E
2
t
[
Jt+1
(
Wt+1, xt+1, µt+1
)]
.
In Appendix A (also see Ju and Miao (2010)), we derive the following Euler equation when the
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optimal portfolio weight ψ∗t is an interior solution in (0, 1):
Et [Mz,t+1 (Rt+1 −Rf )] = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, (20)
where Mz,t+1 denotes the pricing kernel for the recursive smooth ambiguity utility model, which is
given by:
Mz,t+1 =
(
E
z
t
[
Rp,t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
, z = 1, 2. (21)
In period T, the investor consumes all his wealth CT = WT and the portfolio choice has no conse-
quence. When γ = η, the investor is indifferent to ambiguity and the model reduces to the standard
expected utility model. We then obtain the familiar Euler equation for the power utility function.
When the investor is averse to model ambiguity, the standard pricing kernel is distorted by a mul-
tiplicative factor in (21). To interpret this distortion, we normalize the multiplicative factor and
show in Appendix A that the Euler equation can be written as:
0 = µˆtE
1
t
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]
+ (1− µˆt)E
2
t
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]
, (22)
where µˆt is given by:
µˆt =
µt
(
R1t (Jt+1)
)−(η−γ)
µt
(
R1t (Jt+1)
)−(η−γ)
+ (1− µt)
(
R2t (Jt+1)
)−(η−γ) , (23)
and the term
Rit(Jt+1) ≡ E
i
t
[
J1−γt+1
] 1
1−γ
gives the certainty equivalent continuation value associated with submodel i. We interpret µˆt as
the distorted belief about the IID model.
Equation (22) implies that an ambiguity-averse investor makes decisions as if he has distorted
beliefs µˆt in a Bayesian framework. We shall emphasize that µˆt is endogenous (preference depen-
dent) in our model and cannot be generated from a Bayesian posterior according to (15) using
any prior µ0 given the history of data s
t. In addition, the pricing kernel (21) cannot be generated
from any Bayesian model. Thus, our model cannot be reduced to a Bayesian framework and is not
equivalent to any recursive expected utility model.
Equation (23) is key to understanding how an ambiguity-averse investor’s belief is distorted.
We rewrite it as:
µˆt =
µt
µt + (1− µt)
(
R2t (Jt+1)
R1t (Jt+1)
)−(η−γ) . (24)
Suppose that the investor obtains higher certainty equivalent continuation value when data are
generated by the VAR model than by the IID model, i.e., R2t (Jt+1) > R
1
t (Jt+1). If η > γ, then
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equation (24) implies that µˆt > µt. That is, an ambiguity-averse investor attaches more weight on
the IID model than does a Bayesian investor. The opposite is true when the IID model generates
a higher certainty equivalent continuation value. Thus, the ambiguity-averse investor expresses his
concerns about model misspecification by slanting his beliefs towards the “worse model,” the one
that implies a lower certainty equivalent continuation value.
Equation (24) also shows that the amount of distortion in beliefs is large when the difference
between the certainty equivalent continuation values under the two submodels of stock returns is
large (holding µt fixed). This case happens when the conditional expected return under the VAR
model is far from the unconditional mean; that is, when xt takes large positive or negative values.
The amount of distortion is especially large when the Bayesian belief also favors the submodel
with a higher certainty equivalent continuation value. For example, when xt takes a large positive
value and µt is small, the Bayesian belief attaches a high probability to the VAR model of the
stock return which gives a much higher expected stock return than the IID model. In this case,
an ambiguity-averse investor is concerned that the IID model might be the true model of the stock
return, which may generate a large utility loss. He then pessimistically slants his belief heavily
toward the IID model, generating a high µˆt. When xt takes a large negative value and µt is large,
the ambiguity-averse investor fears that the VAR model is the true model of the stock return
and hence adjusts his belief about the IID model downward aggressively. In both cases, the large
distortions in beliefs lead to large differences in investment strategies between an ambiguity-averse
investor and a Bayesian investor.
Does a more ambiguity-averse investor invest less in the stock? Not necessarily, as shown by
Gollier (2007) in a static portfolio choice model. The intuition is simple. The effect of ambiguity
aversion is reflected by a pessimistic distortion of beliefs about the model of the stock return
process. A change of the subjective distribution of asset payoffs may not induce the investor to
demand the asset in a monotonic way. For example, Rothchild and Stiglitz (1971) show that an
increase in the riskiness of an asset’s payoffs does not necessarily reduce the demand for this asset
by all risk-averse investors. In our dynamic portfolio choice problem, we cannot derive analytical
results of an ambiguity-averse investor’s portfolio choice, we thus use numerical solutions to conduct
comparative static analyses.
4. Calibration
In order to provide quantitative predictions, we need to calibrate parameters and solve the calibrated
model numerically. In Section 4.1, we discuss how to estimate models of stock returns specified in
Section 3.1. In Section 4.2, we then calibrate preference parameters. In Appendix B, we present
the numerical method.
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4.1. Data and Model Estimation
There is a large literature documenting that stock returns are forecastable (see references cited in
Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Welch and Goyal (2008)). The predictive variables include
valuation ratios, payout ratios, short rates, slope of the yield curve, consumption-wealth-income
ratio, and other financial variables.
Researchers typically use a VAR system as in (12)-(13) to capture predictability. We estimate
this system and the IID model (9)-(10) using annual data for the U.S. stock market over the period
1926-2005. For stock returns, we use the log returns (cum-dividend) of the CRSP value-weighted
market portfolio (including the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ). We roll over the 90 Day T-Bill
return series from the CRSP Fama Risk-Free Rate file to compute the annual risk-free rates. All
nominal quantities are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), taken from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. We find the mean risk-free rate rf = 0.0078. Panel A of Figure 1 plots the realized
excess log returns (rt − rf ) over the sample.
[Insert Figure 1 Here.]
Following the portfolio choice literature (e.g. Barberis (2000), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Xia
(2001)), we first choose the dividend yield as the predictive variable. We take the demeaned log
dividend yield (ldy) as xt in the regression. We compute it as the log difference between cum- and
ex-dividend returns of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. The demeaned series is plotted
in Panel B of Figure 1. This panel reveals that during the 1990s, the log dividend yield dropped
significantly for a long period of time. Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) argue that this change
is a structural break in the mean of dividend yields.
Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007) argue that the structural break could be
due to the enactment of an SEC rule that encourages stock repurchases. They show that share
repurchases and issuances become a more important part of total payouts over the last 20 years.
They construct total payout yields (adjusting dividend yield for repurchases) and net payout yields
(adjusting for both repurchases and issuances), and find significantly stronger evidence for return
predictability using these new payout yields as predictors. Thus, we also use the total payout yield
or the net payout yield to replace the dividend yield in the VAR estimation. We take the log total
payout yield (ltp) and the transformed net payout yield (lnp) series from Boudoukh, Michaely,
Richardson, and Roberts (2007),9 which is updated to cover the sample 1926-2005 and is available
from Michael Roberts’s homepage. Panels C and D of Figure 1 present these two series, respectively.
These panels reveal that the two adjusted payout yields appear to avoid the structural break issue
for dividend yields. The large negative value of lnp during the Great Depression is due to the
negative net payout yield (about -3%) during that time.
9Boudlukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007) define lnp as log(0.1 + net payout yield) to avoid taking
the log of a negative net payout yield.
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We estimate both the IID and the VAR models using the maximum likelihood method, with
the restriction that the unconditional means of the excess log stock returns and payout yields equal
their sample means. Table 2 reports the estimation results. We take the point estimates as our
parameter values in the IID and the VAR models. We use these parameter values to conduct
numerical analyses below.
[Insert Table 2 Here.]
Table 2 shows that the estimates of the persistence parameter ρ of the predictive variables are
identical to the OLS estimates and hence are identical in both the IID model and the VAR model.
In addition, the estimates of the volatility parameter σx are also identical in these two models. In
the IID model, even though the expected excess stock return is constant over time, the innovation
of the excess stock return is negatively correlated with that of each of the three predictive variables.
In the VAR model, when using the log dividend yield (ldy) as the return predictor, we obtain
results similar to those reported in the literature (e.g., Cochrane (2008)). The coefficient b is 0.105,
with standard error 0.047. The R2 is only 4.9% (not reported in the table). Moreover, the estimate
of the coefficient b is sensitive to the sample period. When estimated using 30-year moving windows
(see Figure 1 of Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008)), the coefficient fluctuates between 0 and 0.5,
and drops substantially towards the late 1990s. These features highlight the statistical uncertainty
confronting investors who try to use dividend yields to predict stock returns. The total payout yield
(ltp) and especially the net payout yield (lnp) show stronger predictive power than the dividend
yield (ldy) in this sample, with R2 rising to 8.8 and 26.5 percent, respectively (not reported in the
table). The predictability coefficients are also statistically more significant, taking value 0.204 for
ltp, and 0.753 for lnp.
The expected excess returns generated by the three predictors have very different properties.
First, the volatility of the expected excess return differs across the three predictors. It is 4.9 and
5.8 percent in the cases of ldy and ltp, respectively, and almost doubles to 10.2 percent in the case
of lnp. Second, the persistence of the expected returns is also very different. Since the predicted
excess returns are assumed to be linear functions of the predictors, they inherit the persistence
of the predictors. As a result, the expected excess returns implied by the log dividend yield are
highly persistent, with a half life of 12.3 years, but less so for the total payout yield (ltp) (half life
of 4.3 years) or the net payout yield (lnp) (half life of 1.6 years). Third, the correlations between
unexpected returns and innovations in expected returns are different. The correlation is about
−0.67 for ldy and ltp, but drops by half to −0.32 for lnp.
The negative correlation means that stock returns are mean-reverting: An unexpected high
return today reduces expected returns in the future, and thus high short-run returns tend to be
offset by lower returns over the long run. This negative correlation is what generates intertemporal
hedging demand for the stock by long-term investors. The predictive variable summarizes invest-
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ment opportunities. The correlation between the stock return and the predictive variable measures
the ability of the stock to hedge time variation in investment opportunities.
[Insert Figure 2 Here.]
In Figure 2, we plot the posterior probabilities of the IID model using the historical data of
stock returns and the three payout yields from 1926 to 2005. The prior in 1926 is set at 0.5. The
three series of posterior probabilities all trend downward over time, suggesting that the data is
overall more consistent with time-varying expected returns. The lower posterior probabilities in
the case of ltp and lnp are consistent with the higher R2 for these predictors in Table 2. For the log
dividend yield, the posterior probability of the IID model is still above 0.1 towards the end of the
sample, and the rise in posterior probabilities in the 1990s is consistent with the structural break
and the resulting poor performance of the dividend yield as a predictor during that time. In the
case of the log net payout yield, the posterior probability of the IID model drops to nearly 0 at
the beginning of the 1930s, which is because the big drop in the net payout yield (see Panel D of
Figure 1) in 1929 and 1930 “successfully predicted” the large negative returns in 1930 and 1931.
Although Figure 2 shows that historical data favor the VAR model over a long sample period
from 1926-2005, there is a small probability that the IID model is on the table for a finitely-lived
investor. In particular, the posterior about the IID model wanders in (0, 1) and is above 0.1 toward
the end of the sample, when the dividend yield is the predictor. Since different model specifica-
tions imply drastically different dynamics of stock returns, concerns about model misspecifications,
sample biases, and out-of-sample performances will expose a finitely-lived investor to considerable
model uncertainty. We will show in Section 6 that the welfare costs of ignoring model uncertainty
is sizable, even though there is a small prior probability that the IID model is on the table.
4.2. Preference Parameters
We need to assign values to preference parameters β, γ, and η. We set β = 0.99 so that it is
approximately equal to 1/(1 + rf ). We consider γ ∈ {2, 5, 10} . These values are commonly used
in the macroeconomics and finance literature. There is no independent study of the ambiguity
aversion parameter η in the literature. We use the hypothetical experiment described in Section
2.2 to calibrate this parameter. As discussed there, we take η ∈ {60, 80, 100}. When η = γ, our
model reduces to the standard Bayesian framework. Finally, we consider a T = 40 years investment
horizon.
5. Dynamic Asset Allocation
In this section, we analyze how learning under ambiguity affects dynamic asset allocation. We
first examine its effects on the hedging demand. We then study how it alters the market timing,
16
uncertainty, and horizon effects often analyzed in the Bayesian framework. Following most papers
in the portfolio choice literature, we focus on the case in which the dividend yield is the single
predictive variable in this section.
[Insert Figure 3 Here.]
Before studying the portfolio implications, we first plot the distorted belief µˆ0 as a function of
the prior belief µ0 and the predictive variable x0 for an ambiguity-averse investor with a 40 year
investment horizon. Consistent with the intuition discussed in Section 3, µˆ0 is slanted upward
in favor of the IID model when the VAR model predicts high expected returns (x0 is large), and
downward in favor of the VAR model when the VAR model predicts low expected returns. In
contrast, there is relatively little distortion in beliefs when the predictive variable is close to its
mean.
The most significant distortion in belief occurs in two regions: (i) when the prior probability
of the VAR model is high (µ0 close to 0) and the expected return according to the VAR model is
also high (x0 is large); (ii) when the prior probability of the VAR model is low (µ0 is close to 1)
and the expected return according to the VAR model is low (x0 is small). In these regions, the
distorted belief µˆ0 is very sensitive to small changes in µ0. As discussed earlier, these are the cases
where the submodel that is deemed unlikely implies particularly unfavorable outcomes relative to
the other submodel. These results are crucial for understanding the investment strategy of the
ambiguity-averse investor.
5.1. Learning, Ambiguity Aversion, and Hedging Demand
As explained in Section 2, we can interpret our ambiguity model as a model of robustness. To
distinguish from other popular investment strategies studied in the literature and in the analysis
below, we refer to an ambiguity-averse investor’s optimal investment strategy as the robust strategy.
Let ψ∗t be his optimal stock allocation in period t. We define ψ
M
t as his myopic demand for the
stock, which is the optimal portfolio weight when the investor behaves myopically by choosing a
stock allocation to maximize the utility derived from his wealth in the next period. We then define
the ambiguity-averse investor’s hedging demand as ψHt ≡ ψ
∗
t − ψ
M
t .
The top panel of Table 3 reports the total stock demand ψ∗0 of an investor with T = 40 years
investment horizon and with various values of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion parameters
(γ, η). Because ψ∗0 is a function of the state variables (µ0, x0) , we also report the values of ψ
∗
0 at
various values of (µ0, x0) . When γ = η, the investor is ambiguity neutral and our model reduces to
the standard Bayesian framework. In this case, we denote the total stock demand as ψB0 and refer
to this investment strategy as the Bayesian strategy.
[Insert Table 3 Here.]
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The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the stock demands when the stock return is described
by the IID model (9)-(10) and the VAR model (12)-(13), respectively. The former investment
strategy corresponds to the case with µ0 = 1 and is studied by Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson
(1969). The latter corresponds to the case with µ0 = 0 and is similar to that derived in Campbell
and Viceira (1999) with the difference that we have imposed short-sale and margin constraints to
ensure nonnegative wealth. We refer to these two investment strategies as the IID strategy and the
VAR strategy, respectively. As is well known from these studies, the stock demand under the IID
strategy is constant over time. By contrast, the stock demand under the VAR strategy depends
on the investment horizon and the predictive state variable. In particular, it increases with the
predictive variable reflecting the market timing effect.
The top panel of Table 3 reveals that the risk aversion parameter γ has bigger effects on the
optimal stock allocation than the ambiguity aversion parameter η. The optimal stock allocation is
very sensitive to the risk aversion parameter γ and decreases significantly when γ increases from 2
to 10. By contrast, the optimal stock allocation is less sensitive to the ambiguity aversion parameter
η, especially when the investor’s uncertainty about submodels is low (i.e. µ0 is close to 0 or 1),
and decreases with η for various values of the state variables (µ0, x0) considered in Table 3. The
difference between the robust and Bayesian strategies can be large. For example, an ambiguity
averse investor with the ambiguity aversion parameter η = 60 invests about 15 percentage points
less in the stock than a Bayesian investor when they both have identical risk aversion parameter
γ = 5, and assign identical prior probabilities, µ0 = 0.1, to the IID submodel of stock returns, and
when the demeaned predictive variable x0 = 0.4659.
10
Next, we turn to the analysis of the hedging demand. We decompose it into two components.
The first hedge component is associated with changes in the predictive variable xt. This component
has been analyzed by Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Kim and Omberg (1996). Recall that
the shock to the predictive variable is negatively correlated with the shock to future stock returns
(i.e., σrx < 0). This negative correlation implies that stocks tend to have high returns when
their expected future returns fall. Since the investor is normally long in stocks for large values
of the predictive variable, a decline in the expected future returns represents a deterioration of
the investment opportunity set. Since the marginal utility of wealth for an investor with high
risk aversion (γ > 1) is high when investment opportunities are poor, he has a positive hedging
demand.11 If the expected excess return (or xt) becomes sufficiently negative, the investor has an
incentive to short stocks so that the no short-sale constraint binds.
The second hedge component reflects the agent’s incentive to hedge against model uncertainty
(or changes in µt). This hedge component is negative and large when xt takes large positive
or negative values. The intuition is as follows. To hedge against the change in the investment
10One standard deviation of xt is σ
x/
√
1− ρ2 = 0.4659.
11As discussed by Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Kim and Omberg (1996), an investor with low risk aversion
γ < 1 has a different hedging behavior.
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opportunity set, the investor wants to sell (buy) assets with payoffs positively (negatively) correlated
with it. When the investor observes a large positive value of xt, an unexpectedly high stock return
induces the investor to attach more weight on the VAR model as discussed in Section 3.2. The
persistence in xt then implies that returns are more likely to be high for a while. Thus, the future
investment opportunity set is positively correlated with the stock return, which induces a negative
hedging demand for the stock associated with model uncertainty. Conversely, if xt takes a large
negative value, an unexpectedly high stock return induces the investor to attach more weight on the
IID model. This also represents an improvement in investment opportunities because the expected
return under the IID model is higher than the VAR model when xt takes a large negative value.
As a result, the investor also has a negative hedging demand if xt takes a large negative value.
Although a similar decomposition appears in the standard Bayesian analysis (e.g., Xia (2001)),
ambiguity aversion affects both hedge components quantitatively, causing significant differences
between the robust and the Bayesian strategies. The component of hedge demand against model
uncertainty is especially important. As we have seen in Figure 3, concerns about model misspec-
ification lead to a pessimistic distortion in beliefs. When xt is large, an unexpectedly high stock
return not only shifts the Bayesian belief µt towards 0, but also lowers the distorted belief µˆt.
When µt is sufficiently small, the investor is highly concerned about model misspecification, which
is reflected in the large and sensitive change of µˆt with respect to small changes in µt (see Figure
3). Thus, a small change in µt induced by a change in stock returns can lead to a large change
in the distorted belief µˆt, which amplifies the negative hedging demand against model uncertainty.
Similarly, the hedging demand against model uncertainty is also amplified when xt takes a large
negative value and µt is close to 1. Thus, we expect the difference between the robust strategy and
the Bayesian strategy to be most significant in these two cases.
[Insert Table 4 Here.]
To examine the hedging component quantitatively, we present the total hedging demand as a
percentage of the total stock demand for various values of (γ, η) and for various values of (µ0, x0)
in Table 4.12 The rows with γ = η correspond to the Bayesian strategy.
Table 4 reveals several interesting results. First, compared to the myopic demand, the hedging
demand typically accounts for a small fraction of the total stock demand. In particular, for small
values of the risk aversion parameter and large values of predictive variables (e.g., γ = 2 and x0 > 0),
the myopic demand under both the Bayesian and the robust strategies accounts for almost all the
stock demand. The total hedging demands under both the Bayesian and the robust strategies are
relatively large when µ0 is small. In addition, they are negative when x0 takes a large positive value
and µ0 is small, reflecting the fact that the hedge component associated with model uncertainty
dominates the hedge component associated with changes in the predictive variable. The opposite
result holds when x0 takes a large negative value and µ0 is large.
12We are unable to present the two hedge components separately, because they do not admit analytical expressions.
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Second, the total hedge demand may not change monotonically with the ambiguity aversion
parameter. This reflects the fact that the two components of the hedging demand discussed earlier
have opposite signs and may offset each other.
Third, when the investor attaches a high prior on the VAR model (e.g., µ0 = 0.1) and when the
predictive variable takes a high value (e.g., x0 = 0.4659), an ambiguity-averse investor may take a
much larger short hedging position than a Bayesian investor. For example, the total hedge demand
is −10.4 percent of the total stock demand for an ambiguity-averse investor with γ = 5 and η = 60,
while it is +3.1 percent for a Bayesian investor with γ = η = 5. For the Bayesian investor, the
negative hedging demand against model uncertainty is dominated by the positive hedging demand
against changes in the predictive variable. In addition, the ambiguity-averse investor reduces his
short hedging position quickly as the prior on the IID model increases. For example, when µ0
increases from 0.1 to 0.9 given x0 = 0.4659, the ambiguity-averse investor with γ = 5 and η = 60
reduces his short hedging position sharply from 10.4 to 1.3 percent of the total stock demand. By
contrast, the Bayesian investor with γ = η = 5 changes his hedging position from 3.1 to −2.3
percent of the total stock demand.
5.2. The Market Timing Effect
An important implication of return predictability for the portfolio choice is market timing. That
is, the optimal stock allocation may depend on the current value of the predictive variable. Figure
4 shows the market timing effect by plotting the optimal stock allocation against the predictive
variable for various values of prior probabilities of the IID model of the stock return process. We
consider four investment strategies: the IID strategy, the VAR strategy, the Bayesian strategy, and
the robust strategy.
As is well known, the IID strategy does not have any market timing effect. The VAR strategy
advises the investor to invest more in the stock when the value of the predictive variable is higher.
In particular, for intermediate values of the predictive variable, the stock demand is approximately
linear, confirming the approximate analytical solution derived by Campbell and Viceira (1999).
When the predictive variable takes sufficiently large values, the investor invests all his wealth in the
stock because expected excess returns are too high. When the predictive variable takes sufficiently
small values, the investor does not hold the stock because expected excess returns are too low.13
By contrast, the Bayesian strategy implies that the optimal stock allocation first increases
with the predictive variable and then decreases with it. Xia (2001) obtains a similar result in
the Bayesian framework with parameter uncertainty. The intuition is that the negative hedge
component associated with model uncertainty dominates the positive hedge component associated
with the predictive variable, when the predictive variable takes sufficiently high values.
Compared to the Bayesian strategy, our robust strategy is more conservative in the sense that
13Recall that we have imposed the short-sale and margin (borrowing) constraints such that ψt ∈ [0, 1] .
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it recommends the investor to invest less in the stock. In particular, the robust strategy curve
is obtained by bending the Bayesian strategy curve downward. When the demeaned predictive
variable takes low and negative values, an ambiguity-averse investor is more likely to not participate
in the stock market than a Bayesian investor. A similar result appears in the multiple-priors model
(e.g., Epstein and Schneider (2007)). When the demeaned predictive variable is close to zero, the
IID and VAR models of the stock returns are similar, and hence deliver similar continuation values
to the investor. As a result, the Bayesian and the robust strategies offer very similar portfolio
advice to the investor.
When the demeaned predictive variable takes large positive values, the robust strategy rec-
ommends a smaller stock allocation than both the VAR strategy and the Bayesian strategy. This
difference is particularly significant when µ0 is small, because, as we discussed before, the distortion
in beliefs is large when the predictive variable takes a large value and µ0 is small, which leads to
large (negative) hedging demand against model uncertainty. Panel A of Figure 4 shows that when
the predictive variable x0 is two standard deviations above the mean and when the prior probability
attached to the IID model is 0.05, the stock allocation advised by the Bayesian strategy is more
than twice as large as that advised by the robust strategy. Similarly, the stock allocation under
the robust strategy is again significantly lower than that under the Bayesian strategy when the
predictive variable takes a small value and µ0 is large.
[Insert Figure 4 Here.]
Importantly, the robust strategy also implies qualitatively different market timing behavior than
the Bayesian strategy in some states. Figure 4 shows that there is a region of states (µ0 is not
too high and x0 is positive and not too large) such that the stock allocation under the Bayesian
strategy increases with the predictive variable, while the stock allocation under the robust strategy
decreases with it. This difference is particularly large for small µ0. The intuition is that in those
states the large negative hedging demand against model uncertainty under the robust strategy
dominates the positive hedging demand against changes in the predictive variable, but the negative
hedging demand against model uncertainty under the Bayesian strategy is not large enough and is
dominated by the positive hedging demand against changes in the predictive variable.
Figure 4 also presents the investor’s investment strategy when he displays infinite ambiguity
aversion with his utility function given by the recursive multiple-priors model (6). This figure
illustrates that a more ambiguity-averse investor does not necessarily invest less in the stock. The
extremely ambiguity-averse investor invests according to the worst-case scenario. In particular,
he does not invest in the stock for sufficiently low values of the predictive variable because at
these values the VAR model of stock returns gives a lower continuation value. The investor invests
according to the IID strategy for sufficiently high values of the predictive variable because at
these values the IID model gives a lower continuation value. As a result, the portfolio rule of an
investor with infinite ambiguity aversion is constant whenever the value of the predictive variable
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is sufficiently above average, which is qualitatively different from the robust strategy in our model.
Only for intermediate values of the predictive variable, the investor times the market by increasing
his stock allocations when the current value of the predictive variable increases.
5.3. The Uncertainty Effect
How does the investor’s stock allocation change when he has different initial prior over the IID
model of the stock return process? Figure 5 plots this uncertainty effect for the Bayesian strategy
and the robust strategy at various values of the predictive variable. Panel A of this figure shows
that under both strategies the investor does not invest in the stock when he believes that the stock
return is more likely to follow the VAR model (i.e., µ0 is small) and when the demeaned predictive
variable takes a large negative value. In this case, the stock is likely to have a negative expected
excess return, and hence the short-sale constraint binds. As the prior probability of the IID model
rises, the investor starts to invest more in the stock, while the robust strategy advises less stock
allocation than the Bayesian strategy. Panel B has a similar feature except that the short-sale
constraint does not bind because the predictive variable takes a larger value.
Panel C plots the case where the demeaned predictive variable takes one standard deviation. It
shows that under both the robust and the Bayesian strategies the investor starts with 100 percent
allocation of initial wealth in the stock when the prior probability of the VAR model is 1. As the
prior probability of the IID model rises, the investor starts to invest less in the stock. Again, the
robust strategy advises less stock allocation than the Bayesian strategy.
Panel D of Figure 5 shows that the investor invests all his wealth in the stock when he believes
the stock return follows the VAR model (µ0 = 0) and when the predictive variable is two-standard-
deviation above the mean. In this case, the expected excess return under the VAR model is much
higher than under the IID model. Surprisingly, even if there is a very small prior probability
that the stock return follows the IID model, an ambiguity-averse investor will decrease his stock
allocation sharply from 100 percent to about 35 percent. This dramatic drop in the stock allocation
is due to the fact that the investor becomes extremely concerned about model misspecification
when the predictive variable takes a large value, and when the VAR model has a high Bayesian
probability. In this case, the hedging demand against model uncertainty can be quite large and
negative (see the discussion in Section 5.1 and Table 4). As the ambiguity-averse investor raises
his prior beliefs about the IID model, he gradually reduces his short hedging positions and starts
to invest more in the stock. This result is in sharp contrast to that obtained in the Bayesian
framework: Conditional on a high value of the predictive variable, a Bayesian investor decreases
his stock allocation monotonically when his prior probability of the IID model rises, which is mainly
driven by the fact that the expected stock return falls as more probabilities are assigned to the
lower IID return.
[Insert Figure 5 Here.]
22
5.4. The Horizon Effect
When stock returns are predictable, the optimal stock allocation depends on the investment horizon.
Figure 6 presents the horizon effect for the VAR strategy, Bayesian strategy, and the robust strategy,
when we fix the belief at the value µt = 0.1 and xt at a value in {−0.4659, 0, 0.4659} over time.
Under the assumption of the VAR strategy, the investor has complete confidence that the stock
return follows the VAR model. In this case, because the shocks to the expected returns and to the
future returns are negatively correlated, the stock appears to be less risky for a longer investment
horizon. Thus, the VAR strategy recommends the investor to invest more in the stock when he
faces a longer investment horizon.
However, if the investor faces model uncertainty, the stock allocation may not be monotonically
increasing in the investment horizon. Consistent with Xia’s (2001) finding, the stock allocation
under the Bayesian strategy may decrease with the investment horizon. This case happens when
the predictive variable takes a high value as shown in panel C of Figure 6. The intuition is the
following: The horizon effect depends crucially on the intertemporal hedging demand. As we discuss
earlier, this hedging demand consists of two components having effects on opposite directions. When
the investment horizon is longer, the hedging component associated with model uncertainty is more
important. Because this hedge component is negative when the predictive variable takes a large
positive value, the investor invests less in the stock when he has a longer investment horizon.
[Insert Figure 6 Here.]
Figure 6 reveals that the robust strategy implies a similar horizon effect to that under the
Bayesian strategy. The difference is that the robust strategy recommends a smaller stock alloca-
tion over time than the Bayesian strategy. The intuition is that an ambiguity-averse investor is
more concerned about model uncertainty and hence the hedging component associated with model
uncertainty is more negative. When the predictive variable x0 is equal to zero, the VAR model
and the IID model are very similar and hence both the robust strategy and the Bayesian strategy
advise similar stock allocations, as shown in Panel B of Figure 6. By contrast, when x0 = 0.4659,
the difference in continuation values between the IID and the VAR models is large, causing a large
difference in stock allocations between the Bayesian and the robust strategies, as shown in Panel
C of Figure 6.
6. Welfare Costs of Suboptimal Investment Strategies
In the previous section, we have shown that the robust strategy may give very different advice to
an ambiguity-averse investor than other popular investment strategies such as the IID strategy,
the VAR strategy, and the Bayesian strategy. These strategies maximize expected utility and are
not optimal to an ambiguity-averse investor. An important question is the following: How costly
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is it to an ambiguity-averse investor if he does not follow the robust strategy when facing model
uncertainty? To study this question, we suppose that an ambiguity-averse investor follows one
of the preceding suboptimal investment strategies given that he has an ambiguity utility function
defined in (5). We then compute this investor’s value function under a suboptimal investment
strategy and compare it with the value function under the optimal robust investment strategy.
Let the initial value function implied by the suboptimal strategy k be Jk0 (W0, x0, µ0) , where
k ∈ {1, 2, 3} indexes one of the preceding three investment strategies. As is standard in the literature
(e.g., Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Xia (2001)), we define the welfare cost as the percentage
wealth compensation ∆k needed to leave the ambiguity-averse investor indifferent between the
suboptimal investment strategy and the optimal robust investment strategy, i.e.,
Jk0
(
W0
(
1 + ∆k
)
, x0, µ0
)
= J0 (W0, x0, µ0) , (25)
where J0 is the initial value function of an ambiguity-averse investor. Note that the welfare cost
∆k depends on the initial state (x0, µ0) . In Appendix B, we describe the method to compute the
welfare cost. For space limitation, here we only report the welfare cost of following the Bayesian
strategy rather than the robust strategy in Figure 7. Xia (2001) has already studied the welfare
implications for a Bayesian investor by comparing the IID, VAR, and Bayesian strategies. We do
not repeat this analysis here.14
[Insert Figure 7 Here.]
Figure 7 shows that welfare costs are sizable for small prior probabilities µ0 of the IID model and
large values of the predictive variable x0. In particular, Panel A of Figure 7 shows that welfare costs
can exceed 20 percent when γ = 5 and η = 60. Panel B shows that when the ambiguity aversion
parameter is increased to η = 100, welfare costs rise even higher. These high welfare costs happen
precisely when the investor believes that it has a high probability that the stock return follows
the VAR model and when the predictive variable takes high values. This result is consistent with
Figures 3–5. As we discussed earlier, for the state vector (µ0, x0) in that region, the robust and the
Bayesian strategies have both large qualitative and quantitative differences. The intuition is that
in that region the IID model of stock returns delivers a lower continuation value to the investor,
which leads him to slant his beliefs towards the IID model because of his pessimistic behavior. Even
though the Bayesian posterior favors the VAR model in the data as shown in Figure 2, there is
always a small probability that the IID model is on the table in a finite sample of data. Concerning
about model misspecification that may lead to a large utility loss, the slanted subjective beliefs
about the IID model can be far apart from the Bayesian beliefs. For example, when µ0 = 0.04, the
distorted belief µˆ0 ranges from about 0.2 to 0.6 when x0 takes values between one and two standard
14In results not reported here, we have computed welfare costs of adopting each of these investment strategies for
an ambiguity-averse investor using different measures of dividend yields and different parameter values. We find that
weflare costs of adopting the VAR strategy are extremely large. These results are available upon request.
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deviations as shown in Figure 3. These large differences in beliefs cause the large differences in
investment strategies.
Figure 7 also shows that the welfare costs are also impressive (about 3 to 7 percent) for large
values of µ0 and small values of x0, although they are not as large as those in the previous case.
The intuition is similar. For this region of states, the VAR model leads to a smaller continuation
value because it implies small expected stock returns. The ambiguity-averse investor slants his
beliefs toward the VAR model, causing µˆ0 to be smaller than µ0 as shown in Figure 3.
For the remaining region of states, welfare costs are very small because both the IID and VAR
models of stock returns give similar continuation values to the investor. Model misspecification
does not lead to too large utility losses so that the investor is less concerned about it.
7. Conclusion
Whether or not the stock return is predictable is highly debated. In this paper, we study an in-
vestor’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem when he is confronted with two possibly
misspecified models of stock returns: the IID model and the VAR model. The investor does not
know which one is the true model and fears that both models may be misspecified. He learns
about the stock return model under ambiguity and his learning problem departs from the standard
Bayesian approach. He copes with the specification doubts by slanting his beliefs pessimistically.
We find that an ambiguity-averse investor’s robust investment strategy is qualitatively and quanti-
tatively different from some other investment strategies studied in the literature. In particular, the
robust strategy is more conservative than the Bayesian strategy. This effect is especially large for
sufficiently high or low values of the predictive variable. For low values of the predictive variable,
an ambiguity-averse investor is more likely to not participate in the stock market. For high values,
the robust strategy recommends much smaller stock holdings than the Bayesian strategy or the
VAR strategy.
In addition, when the prior probability of the IID model is small, there is a region of states such
that the robust strategy advises the investor to decrease his stock allocation with the predictive
variable while the Bayesian strategy advises the opposite. Another interesting finding is for the
case in which the predictive variable takes large values. In this case, even a small prior probability
of the IID model can lead an ambiguity-averse investor to decrease his stock allocation sharply
and then increase it gradually as the prior probability of the IID model rises. This is in contrast
to the Bayesian strategy which implies that the stock allocation decreases monotonically with the
prior probability of the IID model. The key intuition is that the ambiguity-averse investor slants
his belief heavily towards the IID model and this distorted belief is sensitive to small changes in
Bayesian probability. As a result, the hedging demand against model ambiguity is negative and
large when his prior probability of the IID model is small and when the predictive variable takes a
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large value.
We also find that the welfare cost of adopting the Bayesian strategy for the ambiguity-averse
investor can be sizable. It is more than 20 percent of his initial wealth when the predictive variable
takes large values and when the prior probability of the IID submodel of stock returns is small. We
emphasize that our results of large welfare costs and large differences between the Bayesian and the
robust strategies are meaningful because they happen in the empirically relevant region of states
and apply to ambiguity-averse investors with strong priors about the VAR submodel.
In our model, we have assumed that the investor knows the parameters in the submodels of
stock returns. It would be interesting to extend our model to incorporate uncertainty about these
parameters. Such an extension would significantly complicate our analysis. We leave this extension
for future research.
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Appendices
A Proofs of Results in Section 3.3
We conjecture the value function takes the form:
Jt (Wt, xt, µt) =WtGt (xt, µt) , GT = 1. (A.1)
where Gt is a function to be determined. We substitute this conjecture into the Bellman equation
(19) to derive:
WtGt (xt, µt) = max
Ct>0,ψt∈[0,1]
[
C1−γt + β
{
µt
(
E
1
t
[
W 1−γt+1 G
1−γ
t+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)]) 1−η
1−γ
(A.2)
+ (1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
W 1−γt+1 G
1−γ
t+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)]) 1−η
1−γ
} 1−γ
1−η


1
1−γ
.
We substitute the budget constraint (18) into the above Bellman equation to obtain:
WtGt (xt, µt) = max
Ct,ψt
[
C1−γt + β (Wt − Ct)
1−γ Ht (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1)
] 1
1−γ
, (A.3)
where we define
Ht (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1) =
{
µt
(
E
1
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
1−γ G1−γt+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)]) 1−η
1−γ
(A.4)
+ (1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
1−γ G1−γt+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)]) 1−η
1−γ
} 1−γ
1−η
.
We use the first-order condition for Ct to derive
(
Ct
Wt − Ct
)−γ
= βHt (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1) . (A.5)
Solving yields a linear consumption rule:
Ct = atWt, (A.6)
where we define
at =
1
1 + (βHt (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1))
1/γ
. (A.7)
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We may equivalently write the portfolio choice problem as
max
ψt∈[0,1]
1
1− γ
Ht (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1) . (A.8)
In an interior solution, the optimal portfolio weight ψt satisfies the following first-order condition:
0 = µt
(
E
1
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
1−γ G1−γt+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)])− η−γ
1−γ
(A.9)
×
{
E
1
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
−γ G1−γt+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]}
+(1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
1−γ G1−γt+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)])− η−γ
1−γ
×
{
E
2
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
−γ G1−γt+1
(
xt+1, µt+1
)
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]}
.
Substituting the consumption rule (A.6) into the Bellman equation (A.3), we obtain:
Gt (xt, µt) =
[
a1−γt + β (1− at)
1−γ Ht (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1)
] 1
1−γ
=
[
1 + (βHt (ψt, xt, µt;Gt+1))
1/γ
] γ
1−γ
. (A.10)
Thus,
Gt = a
−γ
1−γ
t =
(
Ct
Wt
) −γ
1−γ
. (A.11)
Substituting this equation into (A.9), we obtain:
0 = µt
(
E
1
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
1−γ
(
Ct+1
Wt+1
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ
(A.12)
×
{
E
1
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
−γ
(
Ct+1
Wt+1
)−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]}
+(1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
(
Ct+1
Wt+1
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ
×
{
E
2
t
[
(Rt+1ψt +Rf (1− ψt))
−γ
(
Ct+1
Wt+1
)−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]}
.
Note that Wt+1 = Rp,t+1 (Wt − Ct) = Rp,t+1 (1− at)Ct. So we have
0 = µt
(
E
1
t
[
Rp,t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ {
E
1
t
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]}
(A.13)
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+(1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
Rp,t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ {
E
2
t
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]}
.
From this equation, we deduce that the pricing kernel is given by equation (21). Using this
equation and the preceding equation, we can write the Euler equation as equation (20). We can
also rewrite it as equation (22), where µˆt is distorted beliefs about the IID model given by:
µˆt =
µt
(
E
1
t
[
Rp,t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ
µt
(
E
1
t
[
Rp,t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ
+ (1− µt)
(
E
2
t
[
Rp,t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ])− η−γ1−γ . (A.14)
Using (A.11) and the conjectured value function, we deduce that
Jt (Wt, xt, µt) =
[
C−γt Wt
] 1
1−γ
. (A.15)
Using this equation and the fact thatWt+1 = Rp,t+1 (Wt − Ct) , we can then rewrite (A.14) as (23).
B Computation Method
We use the standard discrete state space value function iteration method, similar to that in Bar-
beris (2000), to solve the model by backward induction. We choose the state space for the state
variables (x, µ) as
[
−4σx/
√
1− ρ2, 4σx/
√
1− ρ2
]
× [0, 1] . We discretize this space using 501× 201
equally spaced points. Increasing grid points does not change our results much. We compute the
expectation in the Bellman equation using the Gaussian quadrature method. In the last period T,
CT = WT , there is no portfolio choice, and GT = 1. In period T − 1, the optimal portfolio weight
ψ∗T−1 ∈ [0, 1] solves the problem:
max
ψT−1∈[0,1]
1
1− γ
HT−1
(
ψT−1, xT−1, µT−1;GT
)
. (B.1)
We next solve for the optimal consumption-wealth ratio a∗T−1 using equation (A.7). Substituting
a∗T−1
(
xT−1, µT−1
)
into (A.11) for t = T−1, we obtain GT−1. In general, suppose at time t, we know
Gt+1. We then use equation (A.8) to solve for the optimal portfolio weight ψ
∗
t (xt, µt) . Substitute
ψ∗t (xt, µt) into equation (A.7) to obtain a
∗
t . Substituting a
∗
t into (A.11), we obtain Gt. We then go
to time t− 1 and repeat the above procedure again, until we reach t = 0.
To solve for the welfare costs of suboptimal investment strategies, we use the following proce-
dure. Let k ∈ {1, 2, 3} index one of the three investment strategies defined in Section 5. These
strategies together with the implied consumption rules satisfy the budget constraint (18) and hence
are feasible for an ambiguity-averse investor’s consumption/portfolio choice problem with the recur-
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sive ambiguity utility (5). Thus they deliver lower life-time utility values than the robust strategy
when the utility function (5) is used. As in Appendix A, we can show that the three suboptimal
investment strategies also give linear consumption rules Ckt = a
k
tWt. Substituting these rules into
(5), we obtain Jk0 (W0, x0, µ0) = W0G
k
0 (x0, µ0) , where G
k
0 is some function. The welfare cost for
suboptimal investment strategy k is given by
∆k (x0, µ0) =
G0 (x0, µ0)
Gk0 (x0, µ0)
− 1.
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Table 1: Ambiguity Premium as a Percentage of the Expected Value of the Bet
γ/η 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0
A. Prize-wealth ratio = 1.0%
0.5 9.8 12.2 14.6 17.0 19.3 21.6 23.8 26.0
2.0 9.4 11.8 14.2 16.6 18.9 21.2 23.4 25.6
5.0 8.6 11.1 13.5 15.8 18.2 20.4 22.7 24.9
10.0 7.4 9.8 12.2 14.6 16.9 19.2 21.4 23.6
15.0 6.2 8.6 11.0 13.4 15.7 18.0 20.2 22.4
B. Prize-wealth ratio = 0.5%
0.5 4.9 6.2 7.4 8.6 9.8 11.1 12.3 13.5
2.0 4.7 6.0 7.2 8.4 9.7 10.9 12.1 13.3
5.0 4.4 5.6 6.8 8.1 9.3 10.5 11.7 12.9
10.0 3.7 5.0 6.2 7.4 8.7 9.9 11.1 12.3
15.0 3.1 4.3 5.6 6.8 8.0 9.3 10.5 11.7
Notes: This table reports ambiguity premium as a percentage of the expected value of the bet for
various different values of γ and η. The expression for ambiguity premium is given by equation (8).
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Table 2: Estimations of the IID and VAR Models
m b ρ (σr)2 × 1000 σrx × 1000 (σx)2 × 1000
ldy
IID 0.058 0.000 0.945 39.352 -19.905 23.148
(0.022) (0.000) (0.046) (6.222) (4.042) (3.660)
VAR 0.058 0.105 0.945 37.432 -19.917 23.148
(0.022) (0.047) (0.051) (5.919) (3.974) (3.660)
ltpa
IID 0.058 0.000 0.850 39.352 -19.079 22.630
(0.022) (0.000) (0.060) (6.222) (3.960) (3.578)
VAR 0.058 0.204 0.850 35.887 -19.079 22.630
(0.022) (0.055) (0.055) (5.674) (3.834) (3.578)
ltpc
IID 0.058 0.000 0.654 39.352 -5.652 10.559
(0.022) (0.000) (0.165) (6.222) (2.365) (1.669)
VAR 0.058 0.753 0.654 28.913 -5.652 10.559
(0.022) (0.133) (0.126) (4.572) (2.053) (1.669)
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating the IID and the VAR models of stock returns.
The numbers in brackets are standard errors. The variable ldy denotes the log dividend yield. The
variables ltp and lnp denote the log total payout yield and the log net payout yield series constructed
by Boudoukh et al. (2007). The sample period is 1926-2005. All variables are annualized when
applicable.
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Table 3: Optimal Portfolio Weights in percentage
µ0 = 0.1 µ0 = 0.5 µ0 = 0.9
(γ, η) x10 x
2
0 x
3
0 x
1
0 x
2
0 x
3
0 x
1
0 x
2
0 x
3
0
2, 2 58.3 100.0 100.0 75.8 100.0 100.0 93.4 100.0 100.0
2, 60 52.5 100.0 100.0 55.3 100.0 99.2 69.6 100.0 98.8
2, 80 51.6 100.0 100.0 52.4 100.0 98.3 62.4 100.0 98.8
2,100 50.9 100.0 98.2 50.6 100.0 98.2 57.1 100.0 99.0
5, 5 29.8 55.3 66.2 33.5 45.5 48.4 37.8 40.3 40.8
5, 60 27.2 51.4 51.1 28.5 44.6 41.4 34.8 40.4 39.6
5, 80 26.6 50.7 47.6 27.3 44.5 40.3 33.5 40.5 39.4
5,100 26.1 50.1 44.8 26.3 44.4 39.5 32.1 40.6 39.3
10, 10 16.1 28.2 31.9 17.3 22.7 23.6 18.9 20.0 20.2
10, 60 15.2 27.0 28.1 15.9 22.5 21.6 18.3 20.1 19.8
10, 80 15.0 26.6 26.9 15.5 22.4 21.1 18.1 20.1 19.7
10,100 14.7 26.3 25.8 15.1 22.4 20.7 17.8 20.1 19.7
γ IID Model VAR Model
x10 x
2
0 x
3
0
2 98.3 53.7 100.0 100.0
5 39.2 30.3 66.1 98.0
10 19.5 17.2 36.7 55.2
Notes: This table presents the optimal portfolio weights in percentage allocated to the stock.
Column 1 denotes various values of γ and η. Columns 2-10 report the optimal portfolio weights in
percentage for different combinations of µ0 and x0 where x
1
0 = −σ3/
√
1− ρ2 = −0.4659, x20 = 0.0,
x30 = σ3/
√
1− ρ2 = 0.4659. The predictive variable x is the price-dividend ratio.
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Table 4: Percentage Hedging Demand over Total Stock Demand
µ0 = 0.1 µ0 = 0.5 µ0 = 0.9
(γ, η) x10 x
2
0 x
3
0 x
1
0 x
2
0 x
3
0 x
1
0 x
2
0 x
3
0
2, 2 25.9 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.3 0.0
2, 60 25.6 0.0 0.0 10.9 0.0 -0.8 -2.1 1.3 0.1
2, 80 25.5 0.0 0.0 12.1 0.0 -1.2 -3.0 1.3 0.4
2,100 25.5 0.0 -1.8 13.6 0.0 -0.5 -3.1 1.4 0.6
5, 5 42.6 26.6 3.1 19.7 12.2 -8.0 2.9 2.3 -2.3
5, 60 40.1 21.1 -10.4 18.5 10.4 -8.3 2.6 2.6 -1.3
5, 80 39.6 19.9 -12.0 18.6 10.2 -7.4 2.4 2.8 -1.1
5,100 39.2 19.0 -12.7 18.9 10.1 -6.4 2.2 3.1 -0.8
10, 10 46.9 28.5 0.2 22.6 12.7 -10.1 3.6 2.4 -2.7
10, 60 45.4 25.2 -7.9 21.6 11.6 -10.8 3.5 2.5 -2.1
10, 80 44.9 24.2 -10.2 21.5 11.4 -10.5 3.5 2.6 -1.9
10,100 44.4 23.4 -11.9 21.4 11.2 -10.1 3.5 2.7 -1.8
Notes: This table presents the ratio of the hedging demand to the total stock demand in percentage.
Column 1 denotes various values of γ and η. Columns 2-10 report the percentage hedging demand
over the total stock demand for different combinations of µ0 and x0 where x
1
0 = −σ3/
√
1− ρ2 =
−0.4659, x20 = 0.0, x
3
0 = σ3/
√
1− ρ2 = 0.4659. The predictive variable x is the price-dividend
ratio.
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Figure 1: Returns and predictors. This figure plots the historical data of the real return from the
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, the demeaned log dividend yield, and the demeaned log total and
net payout yields from 1926-2005. The latter two payout yields are constructed by Boudoukh et al. (2007)
and downloaded from Michael Roberts’ homepage.
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Figure 2: Posterior probabilities of the IID model. This figure plots the posterior probabilities
of the IID model using the historical annual data of stock returns and the three payout yields as predictors
from 1926-2005. The prior is set at µ
0
= 0.5. The log dividend yield (ldy): solid line; the log total payout
yield (ltp): dashdot line; the log net payout yield (lnp): dashed line.
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Figure 3: Distorted beliefs of the IID model. This figure plots the distorted belief of the IID
model as a function of the Bayesian belief of the IID model µ
0
and the demeaned dividend yield x0 for an
ambiguity averse investor with horizon T = 40 years.
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Figure 4: Alternative investment strategies: market-timing effect. This figure plots the initial
portfolio weights on the stock for five alternative investment strategies as functions of the initial observation
of the demeaned log dividend yield x0 for different initial beliefs about the IID model µ0. We set the risk
aversion parameter γ = 5 and the investment horizon T = 40. Other parameter values are estimated using
annual data as reported in Table 2. The standard deviation of the stationary distribution of xt is 0.4659.
The shaded area denotes the region where log dividend yield is within 2 standard deviations from the mean.
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Figure 5: Alternative investment strategies: uncertainty effect. This figure plots the portfolio
weights on the stock for three alternative investment strategies as functions of the initial beliefs about the
IID model µ
0
for four different initial values of the demeaned log dividend yield x0. The standard deviation
of the stationary distribution of xt is 0.4659. We set the risk aversion parameter γ = 5 and the investment
horizon T = 40. Other parameter values are estimated using annual data as reported in Table 2.
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Figure 6: Alternative investment strategies: horizon effect. This figure plots the portfolio
weights on the stock for three alternative investment strategies as functions of the investment horizon. The
standard deviation of the stationary distribution of xt is 0.4659. We set the risk aversion parameter γ = 5
and the initial belief µ
0
= 0.1. Other parameter values are estimated using annual data as reported in Table
2.
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Figure 7: Welfare cost. This figure plots the conditional welfare costs of an ambiguity averse investor
with horizon T = 40 years if he follows the Bayesian strategy. The conditional welfare cost is a function of
the belief of the IID model µ
0
and the demeaned dividend yield x0. We set γ = 5.
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